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"Out of Children's Needs, Children's Rights": The 
Child's Voice in Defining the Family 
Barbara Bennett Woodhouse* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on 
Parents' Rights/ I advocated a new approach to thinking about 
families, which I termed a "generist perspective." A generist 
perspective views nurturing of the next generation as the 
touchstone of the family. This perspective views an adult's 
relationship with children as one of trusteeship rather than as 
one of ownership. Adult "rights" of control and custody yield to 
the less adversarial notions of obligation to provide nurturing, 
authority to act on the child's behalf, and standing to 
participate in collaborative planning to meet the child's needs. 
A generist perspective involves taming the expression of adult 
power known as "rights talk" in order to redirect the discussion 
in terms of meeting children's needs. 
In this paper I take a tentative step toward rehabilitating 
rights talk by suggesting that a new rights discourse (one that 
speaks of children's rights to have their basic needs met by 
adults) may offer a powerful tool of generist politics.2 The 
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Diploma Superiore, Universita per Stranieri, Perugia, Italy, 1965; B.S. University of 
the State of New York, 1980; J.D. Columbia Law School, 1983. My thanks to 
Debbie Nearey Walsh for her secretarial support, to Biddle Law Librarian 
Catherine Krieps for her talents, and to Stephanie Hochberg for able and 
imaginative research assistance. This article is adapted from a paper presented to 
the International Society of Family Law's North American Regional Conference on 
Family Restructuring at the End of the 20th Century, held at Jackson Hole, 
Wyoming, in June, 1993. 
1 Barbara B. Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on 
Parents' Rights, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1747 (1993). The term "generist" should evoke 
words like generation and regeneration, generous (willing to share, unselfish), 
genius (guardian spirit) and genus (ours is honw as in homo sapiens) and derives 
from the Latin verbs generare and genere (to beget) and the Greek gignesthai (to 
be born). !d. at 1754. A generist perspective borrows the tools of feminist method 
to examine how the needs, experiences, and voices of children have been 
overlooked by courts and legislatures. 
2 I use the term "politics" advisedly, recognizing that I am talking about 
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paradox of children's rights, as many have observed, lies in the 
dissonant and yet inseparable meanings of the term. On one 
hand, the term "children's rights" refers to a collective social 
claim to protection based on children's essential dependence. 
On the other hand, children's rights can represent the 
individual child's claim to autonomy. Lee Teitelbaum describes 
the former as "integrative" rights and the latter as "autonomy" 
rights. 3 The tension between the two is inevitable, since 
children must be dependent to grow into independence and 
must become independent to function as autonomous citizens.4 
My title and discussion reflect an attempt to bridge the 
gaps or even harness the energy between these dissonant 
conceptions of children's rights. I take my title from a theme 
voiced by children's rights advocates of the early Twentieth 
Century: "Out of the nature of children arise their needs; and 
out of children's needs, children's rights."5 At the beginning of 
this century, this statement reflected a growing recognition 
that children, as dependent yet evolving citizens, had special 
developmental needs that translated into collective positive 
"rights"-such as rights to recreation, to education, and to 
adult care. These rights both defined public responsibility 
towards children and limited parental power to make 
unregulated decisions about children's custody, control, and 
education or their deployment as economic assets in the labor 
market. Needs-based children's rights provided a powerful 
family policy and not about constitutional or family law. Definitive arguments 
about the source of justification or mechanisms for enforcement of children's rights 
are beyond the exploratory scope of this paper. Assume for present purposes that I 
am indulging in an "all things considered" form of moral reasoning that is most 
concerned, at this stage, with how we talk about children. See LAWRENCE BECKER, 
PROPERTY RIGHTS 17 (1977) (describing an "all things considered" form of moral 
reasoning as one that includes a wide range of justifications, including not only 
typically "moral" reasons but also considerations of prudence, utility, and the moral 
agent's desires and interests). 
3 Lee W. Teitelbaum, Foreword: The Meanings of Rights of Children, 10 
N.M. L. REV. 235 (1980). Needs-based rights seek a necessary "integration" of 
children into society while rights of "autonomy" promote the independence that is 
needed to achieve mature citizenship. ld. at 237, 243. Martha Minow likewise 
notes the tension between autonomy and connection rights but proposes a version 
of children's rights that promotes relationships of connection rather than separation 
of parent and child or parent and community. Martha Minow, Rights for the Next 
Generation: A Feminist Approach to Children's Rights, 9 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 24 
(1986). 
4 Woodhouse, supra note 1, at 1842. 
5 Raymond G. Fuller, Child Labor and Child Nature, 29 PEDAGOGICAL 
SEMINARY 44, 46 (1922). 
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weapon for promoting policies and providing environments 
conducive to children's grow~h toward autonomy. 
Modern scholars distrust talk of children's needs, having 
seen the failures of bureaucratic intervention and the potential 
for judicial bias and gender gerrymandering of the "best 
interests" standard.6 Given children's necessary dependence on 
adults, how can one give independent content to the notion of 
children's "needs"? In Hatching the Egg, I urged that we must 
learn to draw on children's own voices and experiences-not 
only through direct testimony, but by bringing a child-centered 
perspective to children's law. 7 By paying attention to children's 
lives and to what they say and do, as opposed to merely 
listening to what others say about children, perhaps we can 
begin to reduce the dissonance between dependence and 
autonomy and connection and individualism. By incorporating 
children's perspectives and stories in our deliberations, we can 
move children's rights towards a discourse that neither 
assumes a premature autonomy nor denies children the respect 
necessary for their growth toward autonomy. 
In exploring the notion of a reformed children's rights 
discourse, I will begin by sketching a framework for thinking 
about children's rights as an outgrowth of children's needs. 
Next, I will draw on history and international law to show an 
6 See infra text accompanying note 26. See generally Katharine T. Bartlett, 
Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293 (1988); Woodhouse, supra note 1, at 
1756, 1825-27. Critics view the best interest standard as indeterminate and 
reflecting judges' personal biases and adults' power struggles as much as children's 
interests. Among the early critics of the best interest standard were JOSEPH 
GoLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1979), and Robert 
Mnookin, Child Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of 
Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 289-91 (1975). The political nature 
of custody adjudication has been criticized by Martha A. Fineman, The Politics of 
Custody and Gender: Child Advocacy and the Transformation of Custody Decision 
Making in the USA, in CHILD CUSTODY AND THE POUTICS OF GENDER (Carol 
Smart & Selma Sevenhuijsen eds., 1989). The best interest standard has found a 
defender in Carl Schneider, Discretion, Rules and Law: Child Custody and the 
UMDA's Best-Interest Standard, 89 MICH. L. REV. 2215 (1989), who argues that the 
best interest standard is a means, albeit imperfect, of achieving individualized 
justice. 
7 Woodhouse, supra note 1, at 1864. In this article, I argue that children 
and their perspectives have been silenced by traditional legal rules and advocate 
"hard listening" to what children say. Children's perspectives can be incorporated 
in our deliberations through studies of children's development, expert evaluations of 
children's psychological status, children's own stories, play and drawings, children's 
literature, and even adults' memories of childhood. In short, we must draw on all 
our resources to comprehend children's actual experiences of family life. Id. at 1827 
-44. 
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evolving conception of a child's place in the world and an 
evolving understanding of the basis and scope of adult 
authority over children. Finally, in order to illustrate a needs-
based, child-centered perspective on family rights in 
application, I will highlight several difficult cases that suggest 
how a child's own experiences of family can be incorporated 
into our deliberations and used to give substance to children's 
rights. 
II. RECONSTITUTING RIGHTS TALK: CHILDREN'S NEEDS AS THE 
BASIS OF FAMILY RIGHTS 
A. Replacing Parents' Rights with a "Generist" Focus on 
Children's Needs 
"Rights talk" permeates modem American family law. 
Custody law is structured around paternal and maternal rights 
in children and around family rights of autonomy. These rights 
are exercised by parents with children as the objects of paren-
tal decision-making. Recent commentary, from every point of 
the political compass, has sharply criticized "rights talk." Some 
charge that rights talk is a conservative force against move-
ments for social change. Others contend that rights talk ele-
vates individualistic notions of personal freedom over tradition-
al social norms. Still others claim that it undermines the ethic 
of care and the collaborative values needed to sustain families 
and communities.8 
8 See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK (1991) (critiquing the indi-
vidualist thrust of rights talk); Bruce Hafen, Individualism and Autonomy in Fami-
ly Law: The Waning of Belonging, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 28-30 (critiquing notions 
of both parents' and children's rights as eroding "familistic" norms); Catherine 
MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State, 8 SIGNS 635, 656-59 (1983) 
(arguing that rights talk authorizes a male, abstract view of the world); Carl 
Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of American Family Law, 83 
MICH. L. REV. 1803, 1848-60 (1985) (noting the decline of shared norms and the 
rise of the isolated, self-absorbed individual, i.e., the "psychologic man"); Mark 
Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEx. L. REV. 1363, 1364, 1392-94 (1984) 
(critiquing contemporary notions of rights as a conservative force permeated by 
possessive individualism). Among those seeking to defend or reform rights discourse 
are Hendrik Hartog, The Constitution of Aspiration and "The Rights that Belong to 
Us All," 74 J. AM. HIS!'. 1013, 1018 (1987) (describing how the American "dream of 
autonomous identity" uses rights to rise above and reconstitute dependency through 
group action); Martha Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover, 96 
YALE L.J. 1860 (1987) (arguing that rights can serve as evolving tools to express 
human aspirations); Elizabeth Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Per-
spectives from the Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589, 652 (1986) (asserting 
that rights discourse, although flawed, is a necessary aspect of strategies for legal 
321] CHILD'S VOICE IN DEFINING FAMILY 325 
If rights talk raises conflicts within communities, it is 
especially problematic when used to describe parents' relation-
ship with children. Parents need authority to fulfill their re-
sponsibilities towards children. The presumption that parents 
will act to meet children's needs is reflected in the protections 
conferred by parental rights. Parental rights discourse, howev-
er, has the power to influence as well as to reflect cultural 
assumptions. The way we talk about parents and children 
affects how we, as parents, neighbors, and citizens, actually 
behave towards children. A rhetoric of parental rights, when 
repeated often enough in connection with parents' power over 
children, has the potential to undermine the child-centered 
basis of adult authority. Rights rhetoric privatizes and 
objectifies children. It keeps neighbors and, more importantly, 
family at arms length when children need them most. This 
rhetoric also excuses the community from accepting responsibil-
ity for the material conditions of poor and minority chil-
dren-encouraging their marginalization as "other people's 
children."9 
Parental rights are closely linked with an historic legacy of 
viewing the child as the family patriarch's private property, 
which, like other economic rights, is secured from state expro-
priation, confiscation, or regulatory taking. 10 The parental 
and political change); Patricia Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals 
from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401 (1987) (suggesting that 
rights empower outsider and minority voices). 
9 W. NORTON GRUBB & MARVIN LAZERSON, BROKEN PROMISES: HOW AMERI-
CANS FAIL THEIR CHILDREN 43-66, 78-80 (1988); Barbara B. Woodhouse, "Who 
Owns the Child?": Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 995, 1117 (1992); Woodhouse, supra note 1, at 1841. 
10 To say that parental rights are linked to property rights is not to say 
that children are chattels but rather that our culture adopts ways of thinking 
about children analogous to property rights, including the rights to use, to transfer, 
and to exclude others. Woodhouse, supra note 9, at 1042-47. It would also be sim-
plistic to depict parent-child relations as an unbroken progression from a "primi-
tive" property theory towards an "enlightened" theory of children's individual liber-
ty. Conceptions of the parent-child relationship and the community's role in moni-
toring it have varied widely from one region to the next, in different periods of 
United States history, and even in competing visions within a given era. See id. at 
1036-41; Mary Ann Mason, Masters and Servants: The Colonial Model of Child 
Custody and Control (May 28, 1993) (unpublished paper presented at Law & Soci-
ety Annual Meeting, Chicago, Ill., on file with author). Colonial descriptions of 
child-rearing as a highly regulated civic duty contrast with the privatized, laissez-
{aire rhetoric of the late 19th Century, a rhetoric that faded in the face of Progres-
sive Era and New Deal reforms, but seemed to reappear in the individualist ap-
proach to family characteristics of trickle down economics and no-fault divorce in 
the seventies and eighties. 
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rights of control and custody, constitutionalized by the Su-
preme Court in cases like Meyer v. Nebraska 11 and Stanley v. 
Illinois/2 confer a strange liberty that consists in the right to 
control not one's self or one's goods, but another human be-
ing. 13 Echoing the rationalizations used to support male domi-
nance over women and masters' control of slaves, parents' 
rights are justified by assuming unity of interest between pow-
erful and weak. These rationalizations are bolstered by exag-
gerating children's dependence, incompetence, and inability to 
know or describe their own minds or their own experiences. I 
believe this legacy is reason enough to proceed with care in 
authenticating a rights rhetoric for power over children. 
Rights of children, however, seem almost as conceptually 
problematic as rights in children. Liberal theories of individual 
rights invoke images of autonomous rights bearers exercising 
free will in choosing among an array of rights and asserting 
potentially contradictory claims. 14 Because of children's depen-
dence on adult actors, many observers view with skepticism 
attempts to articulate "children's rights" as a counterweight or 
substitute for parents' rights. 15 How do we measure rights, or 
11 262 u.s. 390 (1923). 
12 405 u.s. 645 (1972). 
13 See Akhil R. Amar & Daniel Widawsky, Child Abuse as Slavery: A Thir-
teenth Amendment Response to DeShaney, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1365-72 (1992) 
(characterizing state recognition of parent's rights that resulted in return of child 
to abusive parent as a form of slavery); Douglas Sturm, On the Suffering and 
Rights of Children, 42 CROSS CURRENTS 149, 154-55 (1992) (pointing out striking 
similarities between the dominating parent-child relationship and the slave-master 
relationship of 19th Century Plantation America); Woodhouse, supra note 1, at 
1827-28. 
14 GLENDON, supra note 8, at 47; Martha Minow, Listening the Right Way, 
64 N.Y.U. 1. REV. 946, 957 (1989) (reviewing PAUL CHEVIGNY, MORE SPEECH: DIA-
LOGUE RIGHTS AND MODERN LIBERTY (1988)). Minow notes Chevigny's claim that 
"the only appropriate holder of [a right to free expression or procedural right rel-
evant to solving problems] is one who can contribute an interpretation to discourse; 
she must be able to participate by using language and similar structures." Profes-
sor Minow challenges this claim as dismissing infants and others who lack an 
independent means of expression. !d. 
15 See, e.g., John E. Coons et al., Puzzling over Children's Rights, 1991 
B.Y.U. L. REV. 307, 308 (expressing bafflement over the notion of children's rights 
and identifying quandaries and enigmas relating to the temporal boundaries of 
childhood, children's entitlement in the face of their essential interdependency, 
children's responsibilities, and children's voice as translated through child advo-
cates); Martin Guggenheim, A Right to Be Represented but Not Heard: Reflections 
on Legal Representation for Children, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 76, 77 (1984) (expressing 
skepticism about independent advocacy for children); Hafen, supra note 8 
(critiquing divisiveness of children's rights); Martha Minow, Are Rights Right for 
Children?, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 203, 211 (expressing concern that litigation 
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determine when a child graduates from dependence to autono-
my? How can we, as adults, purport to speak disinterestedly for 
children? If children's rights, as I suggest, derive from 
children's "natures" and "needs," how can we give authentic 
content to such highly contingent and value-laden terms? As 
Martha Minow has illustrated, the very term "children's rights" 
provides cover for a variety of social judgments about what 
children need, their sameness or difference, how much autono-
my they should be entitled to claim at a given age, and how 
much decision-making autonomy adults want to give them. 16 
While the puzzles and dangers involved in articulating 
children's rights are intimidating, the status quo presents its 
own dilemmas. The current discourse, in which children's mere 
"interests" are easily overwhelmed by parents' powerful 
"rights," entails less obvious but equally problematic choices 
about allocating power over children and about when action or 
inaction constitutes state "intervention" or "oppression."17 Per-
haps children, as the least powerful members of both the fami-
ly and the political community, are also the least dangerous of 
rights-bearers and the most in need of an affirmative rights 
rhetoric in order to be heard. By defining children's rights as 
flowing from their needs, we can affirm rather than undermine 
an ethic of care for others. By listening to children's voices and 
experiences as evidence of their needs, and by trying to come to 
terms with the children's reality, we can confront our own 
adult ambivalence and conflicts of interest regarding children's 
rights. 
B. The Progressive Vision: Children's Rights as a Corollary of 
Children's Dependence and Their Capacity for Growth 
I can offer, as yet, no fully developed theory of children's 
rights to complement a generist theory of family, but I can 
imagine a place to start, albeit a controversial one. A century 
to enforce children's rights imposes a preference for procedural rather than sub-
stantive solutions). 
16 MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, 
AND AMERICAN LAW 283-89 (1990). "Rights for children, thus far, have expressed 
rather than resolved adult ambivalence about them." ld. at 288; see also Minow, 
supra note 3, at 24. 
17 See Frances Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 
835 (1985) (arguing that state intervention is an incoherent concept and question-
ing why we consider it intervention when the state removes a battered child from 
her home but not when the state returns a runaway child to her parents). 
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ago, in an America reacting to the excesses of laissez-faire 
economics and the industrial revolution, the children's rights 
movement challenged parents and society to revisualize rela-
tions between children, parents, and community. These chal-
lenges were not claims of children's autonomy.18 Progressive 
Era advocates for children made broad claims about the child's 
human dignity, yet frankly accepted children's dependence and 
used it as a springboard for asserting children's collective claim 
of rights to adults' respect, protection, and care. In their dis-
course, these advocates harnessed the moral force of depen-
dence and interdependence, using it not only to rebut individu-
alist arguments of absolute parental rights of autonomy and 
control, but also to persuade the polity of the "rightness" of 
legislation to protect and benefit all children. 
Children's rights, for these advocates, were not contingent 
on children's autonomy but existed in service of their nature, 
defined as a capacity for growth toward autonomy. Drawing 
upon notions of intrinsic human dignity used by abolitionists 
and women's advocates, the so-called "child savers" argued that 
children's capacity for growth proved their rights to those 
things essential to physical growth and social development. 19 
Accordingly, the child savers went on to argue that parents 
possessed no rights, and have only the responsibilities of a "sa-
cred trust."20 The metaphor of trusteeship is, of course, a 
property metaphor, but trusteeship is significantly different 
from fee simple estate or chattel ownership. 
The trusteeship metaphor imposes an ethic of care and 
condemns selfish exploitation. Adults may claim the "right" to 
serve in capacities of trusteeship without claiming the full 
panoply of property "rights" to exclude, transfer, or exploit 
without concern for their beneficiaries' needs. 21 The Progres-
sive reformers stressed that parents' trusteeship was shared by 
the community at large and reflected recognition of a collective 
as well as an individual stake in "generativity." ''The care of 
children," they reminded robber baron America, is essential not 
18 Teitelbaum, supra note 3, at 252; Woodhouse, supra note 9, at 1050-58. 
19 Woodhouse, supra note 9, at 1051; cf Elizabeth B. Clark, Religion, Rights, 
and Difference in the Early Woman's Rights Movement, 3 WIS. WoMEN'S L.J. 29, 48 
(1987) (describing the notion within the women's rights movement that "the wing 
of the bird indicates its right to fly"). 
20 Minot J. Savage, The Rights of Children, 6 ARENA MAG. 8, 13-14 (1892). 
21 See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
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only to a family dynasty's perpetuation but also "to the preser-
vation of the community."22 
Although couched in images of dependence and interdepen-
dence, this articulation of children's rights provided a platform 
for real strides in meeting children's needs for health care, 
education, and protection from exploitation as they grew into 
autonomous citizens.23 It also conveyed a powerful cultural 
image, one at odds with laissez-faire understandings of children 
as private property, one that asked individual parents to give 
up traditional forms of unregulated control. Thus the parents' 
right of custody must yield to child-centered concepts like "best 
interest" and "tender years." The parents' right to exploit 
children's labor must yield to the child's rights to recreation 
and to a free public education. 
The discourse of needs-based children's rights charged 
individual parents, the community, and the nation with respon-
sibility for insuring children's well-being. This discourse also 
reflected changing views on the status of children as people, as 
well as on the developmental needs of children.24 
We have been experiencing a rapidly changing family soci-
ology in the United States and worldwide, marked by poor 
children having more children, affluent adults having fewer 
children, fewer adults actually sharing households with chil-
dren, families with children losing economic ground, and in-
creasing numbers of children living in extremely poor fami-
lies.25 In the public policy arena, an impassioned revival of 
social concern similar to the Progressives' turn-of-the-century 
assault on the laissez-faire legal regime may be needed to coun-
teract the growing risk that children's critical social value will 
be overlooked by an individualistic, market-oriented society 
22 Hastings H. Hart, The Child-Saving Movement, 58 BIBLIOTECCA SACRA 
520, 520 (1901). 
23 See generally ROBERT H. BREMNER, CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN AMERICA 
(1979) (reprinting primary documents relating to maternal and child health bills, 
compulsory education, and labor laws). 
24 One of the most effective rhetorical weapons of the child labor movement 
was comparing power over children with ownership of animals and other living 
chattels, a comparison borrowed from attacks on slavery. See, e.g., NARRATIVE OF 
THE LIFE OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS, AN AMERICAN SLAVE 91-92 (discussing how 
family members were sold "like so many sheep"); Woodhouse, supra note 9, at 1065 
(children analogized to slaves and horses); cf VIVIANA A. ZEUZER, PRICING THE 
PRICELESS CHILD 3 (1986) (tracing changing notions of child's role in society and 
family). 
25 See A.B.A., AMERICA'S CHILDREN AT RISK: A NATIONAL AGENDA FOR LEGAL 
ACTION v-viii (1993); Woodhouse, supra note 1, at 1761-67 (gathering statistics). 
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groping to adjust to rapid and destabilizing structural change. 
On the level of private ordering, a discourse structured around 
children's needs-based rights could help families in dissolution 
reach less adversarial and more functional restructuring out-
comes. 
I recognize my revitalization of Progressive traditions is a 
controversial move, as it seems to accept uncritically the 
Progressives' faith in human perfectibility and to discount 
evidence that Progressive reformers, like do-gooders and bu-
reaucrats in every era, were guilty of destructive, paternalistic 
intervention in the lives of the poor.26 The child savers' fail-
ures reflect the serious but inherent risks of action taken "on 
behalf' of children, and of establishing nonns of conduct in a 
heterogenous democratic society marked by inequalities of race 
and class. Nevertheless, the child labor, mental health, educa-
tion and settlement house movements, maternal and infant 
health initiatives, and those earliest calls for mothers' allow-
ances produced real benefits for children-not the least impor-
tant of which was a renewed sense of children's connection to 
the community. Perhaps we can avoid some of the child-savers' 
cultural myopia and paternalism by bringing children's own 
voices to bear on defining children's rights. Particularly in state 
interventions involving poor children and children of color, 
policy-makers and judges need to see children not as abstract 
constructions of innocence detached from their surroundings, 
but as real people embedded in families and communities. 
These children have their own deep attachments, experiences, 
and individual needs that may not confonn to the child saver's 
own values or experience.27 
26 LINDA GoRDON, HEROES OF THEIR OWN LIVES passim (1988); GRUBB & 
LAZERSON, supra note 9, at 43-66; Teitelbaum, supra note 3, at 252. 
27 See Woodhouse, supra note 1, at 1834 n.387 (listening to Malcolm X, the 
foster child, describing the destruction of his home and family by "the welfare"); 
Olsen, supra note 17, at 858-61 (stating that the state often fails to listen to chil-
dren, harming them more through intervention than by state neglect). I personally 
am stunned each year at the number of students in my course on abuse and ne-
glect who believe that a "normal" child would wish to be rescued from an other-
wise fit home because it lacks running water or to be saved from a mentally ill 
but non-violent and attached mother. 
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C. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: 
Harmonizing Dependence and Capacity, Needs and Voice 
Like history, international law supplies another source of 
children's rights discourse. The 1989 United Nations Conven-
tion on the Rights of the Child, drawing on a spectrum of hu-
man rights traditions, invokes broad notions of children's au-
tonomy combined with needs-based integrity rights. 28 Its most 
important role is not in articulating claims of rights to be as-
serted by children in courts of law, but in proposing norms of 
justice to guide adults in acting on children's behalf and in 
constructing laws and social policies.29 These norms sound odd 
to United States lawyers, accustomed as we are to litigating 
negative rights to be left alone and concrete positive rights that 
give rise to a legal cause of action. The Convention's norms are 
an amalgam of both connection and autonomy, combining no-
tions of children as dependent members of families and commu-
nities with notions of children as individuals with unique per-
sonalities and emerging moral and social lives which parents 
and governments are explicitly charged with acknowledging. 
Most importantly, according to the scheme of this Conven-
tion, children have the capacity for growth toward autonomy 
and deserve the right to be treated in a manner consistent with 
this capacity. 30 The Convention identifies the right of children 
who are capable of forming their own views to express these 
views in matters affecting them, either directly or through a 
representative.31 It talks of children's freedom of thought, con-
science and religion, and assigns to parents the duty of provid-
ing direction in a manner consistent with the child's evolving 
28 Evaluating the state of children's rights in the United States today, ob-
servers conclude we are far from meeting many of these goals, especially in provid-
ing substantive rights to care. CHILDREN'S RIGHTS IN AMERICA: U.N. CONVENTION 
ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD COMPARED WITH UNITED STATES LAW 94-95 (Cynthia 
P. Cohen & Howard A. Davidson eds., 1990) [hereinafter CHILDREN'S RIGHTS IN 
AMERICA] (pointing out poor performance in health care, child care); see id. at 163-
64 (shortcomings in effective access to decision-making in courts and administrative 
proceedings); id. at 337 (noncompliance in removing children from poverty). 
29 See Frances Olsen, Sex Bias in International Law: The U.N. Convention 
on the Rights of the Child, 3 INDIAN J. Soc. WORK 491, 496 (1992) (noting poten-
tial of positive rights to set agendas for change but expressing concern about bur-
dens on caretakers). 
30 CHILDREN'S RIGHTS IN AMERICA, supra note 28, at xiv (Art. 5 of the Con-
vention, evolving capacity). 
31 !d. at xvi (Art. 12 of the Convention, expression of views). 
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capacities.32 Some articles acknowledge children's human 
rights to respect, including freedom from arbitrary attacks on 
their privacy, family, home, or correspondence, as well as from 
attacks based on ethnicity and religion, and freedom from dis-
crimination. 33 Others are social or economic rights: to an ade-
quate standard of living, to education, health care, and social 
insurance.34 Government entities must seek to further these 
standards to "the maximum extent of their available resourc-
es."35 
Additionally, under the Convention, children have unique 
rights that reflect their special status of dependency coupled 
with their capacity for growth: the right to recreation, to pro-
tection from physical abuse and sexual or economic exploita-
tion, and "the child's right to preserve his or her identity."36 
Entitlement to support and guidance from both parents, who 
will make the child's best interest "their basic concern," is ar-
ticulated as a child's right, not a parents' privilege,37 as are 
the rights to know, and be cared for by, one's "parents," and not 
to be separated from them "except [when] in the best interest 
of the child."38 A comparison with the 1959 United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of the Child, suggests a continuing 
concern with meeting children's material and developmental 
needs, but an increased respect for children's voices, for their 
personal dignity, and their membership in family and commu-
nity.39 
32 Id. at xvi (Art. 14 of the Convention). Compare this formulation with 
much of our First Amendment jurisprudence which emphasizes parents' expression 
of religious autonomy through their children rather than children's own rights to a 
religious identity. See generally Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Prince v. 
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). 
33 CHILDREN'S RIGHTS IN AMERICA, supra note 28, at xvii (Art. 16 of the 
Convention, freedom from attacks on privacy); id. at xxiv (Art. 30 of the Conven-
tion, protection of continuity of care and ethnic, religious, cultural, linguistic back-
ground). 
34 Id. at xxi (Art. 24 of the Convention, economic rights). 
35 Id. at xiii (Art. 4 of the Convention, states undertake all appropriate 
efforts to implement children's economic, social, and cultural rights "to the max-
imum extent of their available resources and, where needed, within the framework 
of international cooperation"). 
36 Id. at xxiv (Art. 32 of the Convention, economic exploitation); id. at xxv 
(Art. 34 of the Convention, sexual exploitation); id. at xxiv (Art. 31 of the Conven-
tion, need for recreation); id. at xxviii (Art. 19 of the Convention, protection from 
abuse); id. at xiv (Art. 8 of the Convention, identity). 
37 ld. at xxii (Art. 27 of the Convention, right to support); id. at xviii (Art. 
18 of the Convention, child's best interest). 
38 ld. at xiv-xv (Arts. 7 and 9 of the Convention). 
39 Declaration of the Rights of the Child, U.N. Res. 1386 (XIV) (1959); see 
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Clearly, such a broad charter raises many familiar issues 
of interpretation. What is a parent? A family?40 How do we 
evaluate evolving capacities? When is a child capable of form-
ing its own views? What are the child's best interests? What 
exactly are available resources? Nevertheless, the Convention 
creates a normative framework for considering children as 
dependent but evolving individuals; not autonomous, and yet 
possessing rights; not articles of traffic but people whose care is 
entrusted to adults who are charged with acting in their best 
interests. Children are seen as individuals belonging to and 
having claims upon families and larger communities. Most 
importantly for this discussion, children's needs for continuity 
of relationships and for protection in the formation and preser-
vation of their religious, cultural, and family identity are ar-
ticulated as children's rights and adults' responsibilities. 
Ill. RECONSTITUTING CUSTODY CLAIMS AS CHILDREN'S NEEDS-
BASED RIGHTS TO IDENTITY AND CONTINUITY 
A. Thomas S. v. Robin Y.:41 Respecting the Child's 
Perspective 
How, if at all, would family law dilemmas be addressed 
differently or better through a discourse of children's needs-
based rights? I give you the case of Thomas S. v. Robin Y. 42 
This 1993 New York case involved a claim by a biological fa-
ther, a gay man, who had donated sperm to a lesbian woman, 
Robin Y. He had agreed not to assert parental rights in the 
child, a daughter named Ry, but to be available should the 
child want to establish a relationship with him. Robin Y.'s 
Teitelbaum, supra note 3, at 238 (describing the Declaration of the Rights of the 
Child as focused on children's needs rather than desires). 
40 The Convention does not define the terms "parent" or "family," and 
Frances Olsen (as well as the text of Art. 5) suggests room for cultural pluralism 
and recognition of a "multiplicity of family forms." See CHILDREN'S RIGHTS IN 
AMERICA, supra note 28, at xiv (Art. 5 of the Convention, stating that state parties 
shall respect the "responsibilities, rights, and duties of parents, and where applica-
ble, the members of the extended family or community as provided by local cus-
tom, legal guardians or other persons legally responsible for the child," to provide 
guidance appropriate to his or her capacities in the exercise of the child's rights); 
Olsen, supra note 29, at 510. 
41 599 N.Y.S.2d 377 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1993). As this article went to press, 
Thomas S. is on appeal to the New York Supreme Court, First Appellate Division. 
Briefs have been flied, including an amicus curiae brief by the Legal Action Project 
of the National Committee for the Rights of the Child. 
42 ld. 
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partner, Sandra R., had conceived and given birth to a daugh-
ter, named Cade, through a similar arrangement with another 
donor the previous year. When the girls were four and five, re-
spectively, they expressed curiosity about their origins, and the 
couple initiated contact with the biological fathers. Thomas S., 
Ry's biological father, established a relationship of visits and 
correspondence with the family. When Ry was nine, however, 
this informal arrangement broke down. In encouraging visits 
with Thomas S., the women had stressed the importance of 
treating the two girls equally and of respecting and affirming 
Ry's perception of her two mothers and sister as her family 
circle. Thomas S. found it increasingly difficult, however, not to 
favor Ry as his biological child. When he asked to take the 
children to visit his biological family in California, but without 
either of their mothers, the mothers refused. Thomas S. filed a 
petition seeking a declaration of paternity and court-ordered 
visitation with Ry. 
In denying the father's petition, the judge carefully exam-
ined the child's own definition of her family. Instead of address-
ing the question primarily as one of a parent's rights in a child, 
or even as one of reciprocal rights within a parent-child dyad, 
the court considered the entire family system and Ry's percep-
tion of her place in it: 
The reality of her life is having two mothers, Robin Y. and 
Sandra R., working together to raise her and her sister. Ry 
does not now and has never viewed Thomas S. as a functional 
third parent. To Ry, a parent is a person who a child depends 
on to care for her needs. ToRy, Thomas S. has never been a 
parent since he never took care of her on a daily basis. 43 
The judge made the following observations concerning the 
dispute's effect on Ry: 
[It has] already caused Ry anxiety, nightmares, and psycho-
logical harm. Ry views this proceeding as a threat to her 
sense of family security. For her, a declaration of paternity 
would be a statement that her family is other than what she 
knows it to be and needs it to be. To Ry, Thomas S. is an 
outsider attacking her family, refusing to give it respect. 44 
43 ld. at 380. 
44 ld. at 382. 
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It would be futile, the judge concluded, to force Ry to visit 
Thomas S. and his biological relatives, who were all complete 
strangers to her.45 
Suppose we were to apply to this case a discourse based on 
children's rather than parents' rights. Ry, through her own 
concrete description of her family, asserted a needs-based right 
to continuity of functional relationships and to protection of her 
family's integrity and to her own social identity. The court did 
not dismiss out of hand another of Ry's potential rights, the 
right to know her biological identity-it noted that she under-
stood the biological connection but viewed it with indifference. 
The judge acknowledged that, inevitably, Ry's views had been 
shaped by the views of her mothers about what constitutes a 
family, but the court respected the apparent integrity of her 
strongly held conviction-conveyed by concrete examples and 
actions as well as words-that she had more to lose than to 
gain from a forced legal recognition of the father-child relation-
ship. 
This case illustrates how a child-centered perspective on 
family rights interprets children's needs for continuity and 
protection of a network of family attachments. These needs, 
viewed through the child's eyes, took precedence over the 
father's "right" to redefine Ry's family along biological lines and 
establish a father-child relationship destructive to the child's 
own family experience. 
The court also stressed an estoppel theory based upon the 
father's role in knowingly creating and approving of Ry's func-
tional family unit.46 Thus, the court's description of Ry's needs 
for integration and connection was reinforced by the more tra-
ditional argument, based in notions of adult autonomy and 
contract, that Thomas S. had waived any parental claims. 
B. Children's Rights to Identity 
But what of cases in which these traditional elements of 
consent, waiver, and estoppel are lacking? When children are 
separated from their biological families by accident, error, or 
violation of law, how do we balance the child's perspective on 
her own identity with the biological parents' rights? Several 
45 ld. 
46 ld. at 381·82. 
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recent cases have dominated the media with stories involving 
children of differing ages and circumstances. 
1. "She's not Baby Jessica anymore" 
One such dispute involved three-year-old Jessica DeBoers. 
This child was surrendered by her biological mother, Cara 
Clausen, for private adoption shortly after birth. The Michigan 
couple with whom she was placed, the DeBoers, believed they 
had also obtained the biological father's consent. Nevertheless, 
another man, Daniel Schmidt, came forward as the child's 
biological father and eventually married the mother. Mter 
protracted litigation, the denial of the DeBoers' adoption pe-
tition was affirmed by the Iowa Supreme Court.47 The would-
be adoptive parents turned to the Michigan courts, claiming the 
child's interests must be considered. Framed by the media as a 
choice between the child's perspective ("[t]hese children don't 
care about biology .... [t]hey know who loves them and who 
they love") and the biological father's rights ("[t]his is the most 
fundamental right you have in this country"), the case was ar-
gued to the Michigan Supreme Court. The court held that 
Michigan courts were precluded from considering Jessica's 
interests as long as a fit biological parent claimed her as his 
own.48 The United States Supreme Court denied the DeBoers' 
and Jessica's applications for a stay from the Michigan order 
returning her to her biological parents.49 Only Justice 
Blackmun, joined by Justice O'Connor, dissented, saying he 
was troubled by the prospect of placing a child at serious risk 
without having addressed her claim that the lower court's 
failure to consider her interests violated her due process 
rights. 5° 
In March 1994, seven months after her tearful face ap-
peared on television screens across the country as she was 
removed from "the only home she had ever known," Jessica was 
47 In re Baby Girl Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649, 660 n.30 (Mich. 1993); In re 
B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239, 245 (Iowa 1992) (interpreting Iowa law regarding failed 
adoptions as allowing consideration of the child's best interest only if the biological 
mother is unfit). 
48 In re Baby Girl Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649, 657 (Mich. 1993) (applying the 
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act's jurisdictional provisions to bar relitigation of 
the Iowa court decision); Judy Daubenmier, Two Sets of Parents Take Custody 
Battle to Michigan High Court, PHILA. INQUIRER, June 4, 1993, at A23. 
49 DeBoer v. DeBoer, 114 S. Ct. 1 (1993). 
50 DeBoer v. DeBoer, 114 S. Ct. 11 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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featured on the cover of Newsweek Magazine. Smiling and 
apparently happy, she is now called Anna Schmidt and the 
media reports that she is adjusting well-"She's Not Baby 
Jessica Anymore."51 
2. In search of Arlena 
The Kimberly Mays/ Arlena Twigg case involved two babies 
accidentally switched at birth. Mr. and Mrs. Twigg discovered 
during the final illness of a nine-year-old "daughter," whom 
they called Arlena, that she was not their biological child. 
When Arlena died of congenital heart defects, they searched for 
their "real" daughter and found her living in Florida. Her 
mother had died, and she lived with her father, Robert Mays, 
whom she had every reason to believe was her biological kin.52 
The Twiggs sought court-ordered blood tests and a declaration 
of parentage, but Kimberly and Robert Mays won a court rul-
ing effectively blocking discovery. Later, however, the Mays 
voluntarily agreed to informal visits. Robert Mays became 
concerned when Kimberly's emotional health and school work 
suffered. She seemed disturbed that Mrs. Twigg had asked to 
call her "Arlena" and be addressed as "Mom." The visits seemed 
to be undermining her stability within the Mays family. Mays 
suspended the visits, and the Twiggs sued for custody. Mter 
years of litigation, finally teenaged Kimberly herself brought a 
petition to terminate whatever rights her biological parents 
might claim-an action the press quickly characterized as a 
child "divorcing her biological parents."53 
In one moving courtroom interchange, the girl put her 
head in her arms and sobbed, as the Twigg's attorney declared 
that Kimberly Mays was dead and the young lady in the 
courtroom was really Arlena Twigg. 54 Kimberly Mays won the 
court battle to control her own identity. In August 1993, a 
Florida court ruled that she should not be forced against her 
51 Michele Ingrassia & Karen Springen, She's Not Baby Jessica Anymore, 
NEWSWEEK, Mar. 21, 1994, at 60. 
52 For a review of the facts and allegations, see, e.g., Mays v. Twigg, 543 
So. 2d 241 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (refusing the Twiggs' discovery requests pend-
ing a determination of probability of success on the merits), and sources cited infra 
notes 53-58. 
53 Gail Collins, Lawyers, Shrinks and Money Dominate Feud, NEWSDAY, Aug. 
3, 1993, at 5; Jeffrey Good, 1 Want My Life Back, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, July 28, 
1993, at lA. 
54 Good, supra note 53, at lA. 
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will to maintain contact with her biological parents. Robert 
Mays would remain Kimberly's legal father. The judge rea-
soned that the Twiggs had disregarded Kimberly's well-being 
by attacking her attachments to the family that had raised her 
and by trying to coerce a relationship against her will. 55 The 
girl greeted the court's decision with elation. Children's advo-
cates and opinion-makers across the country praised the deci-
sion as a victory for children's rights.56 
In March of 1994, Kimberly/Arlena was back in the media 
spotlight, along with Baby Jessica/Anna. She had left Robert 
Mays' home for a youth shelter and from there, with the coop-
eration of both the Mays and Twigg families, she had gone to 
live temporarily with the Twiggs.57 What are we to make of 
Kimberly/Arlena's change of heart? Of Jessica's apparent ad-
justment to her new identity as Anna? Do these sequels vindi-
cate the critics or the supporters of a children's rights perspec-
tive? 
We have much to learn about children's needs for stability 
and how they adjust to various state interventions. Neverthe-
less, the question of what children need is a separate one from 
the question of whether children's needs or parents' rights 
should guide our laws on custody. Psychologists commenting on 
these cases suggest that Jessica/Anna's ability to smile and 
Kimberly/Arlena's quest for identity should not be interpreted 
as proof that forced intervention to reshape their families was 
(in Jessica's case) or would have been (in Kimberly's case) free 
of harm and pain to the child. Rather, their experiences demon-
strate the capacity for healing and for growth that sustains 
children through traumas like adoption, divorce, and death.58 
Arguably, a child-centered perspective on children's identity 
rights should be guided, like medical ethics, by the maxim of 
"First, do no harm."59 
55 Christina Sherry, Judge Lets Girl Sever Birth Ties; Biological Parents Are 
Denied Visitation in 'Baby Swap' Case, WASH. POST, Aug. 18, 1993, §1, at Al. 
56 Biology Doesn't Make the Parent, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1993, at A14; Wil· 
liam Booth, Tangled Family Ties and Children's Rights, WASH. PoST, Mar. 11, 
1994, §1, at A3. 
57 Booth, supra note 56, at A3; Jean Seligmann & Susan Miller, Kimberly's 
About-Face, NEWSWEEK, March 21, 1994, at 66. 
58 Seligmann & Miller, supra note 57, at 66; Gail Collins, Switched or Not, 
Teen-agers Change Their Minds, HOUSTON CHRON., Mar. 11, 1994, at A23; Sonya 
Live (CNN television broadcast, Mar. 14, 1994). 
59 This is the thrust of Goldstein, Freud & Solnit's "least detrimental alter-
native" under which courts are advised to respect the child's attachments and 
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The temptation to focus on punishing the wrong-doers or 
on vindicating the rights of innocent biological parents, rather 
than on meeting children's needs, often seems overwhelming. 
Nevertheless, acts that constitute ''justice" between adults, 
such as restoring a child's "real" name, or "rescuing" a child 
from her "abductors" and returning her to her "real family," 
when examined from the child's perspective, risk compounding 
the original violation. The child's family integrity is violated 
twice: once by the erasure of her biological identity when sepa-
rated from her original family and again by the assault on her 
social identity when her present psychological and functional 
family ties are destroyed. In the custody context, perhaps the 
principle of "do no harm" is best served by respecting the 
child's own perspective of her family and identity rather than 
forcing her to conform to the adults' perspective. 
A discourse of children's rights might do a better job of 
prescribing just remedies in fundamentally unjust cases by 
shifting away from justice between adults and stressing instead 
the needs-based right of these children. Many adoptees, as 
well as specialists in child development, might argue that such 
children have a need to preserve and protect their lived identi-
ties and also a need to recapture and to reconstruct their lost 
or violated identity.60 Such a goal would promise restorative 
justice, even if it delayed vindication of innocent adults' rights 
by allowing for a gradual reintegration of child and biological 
family. A child's needs (reflected in intertwined strands of chil-
dren's rights) for connection and identity are not necessarily 
furthered by abrupt, coercive severing of her functional family 
ties--even when the bonds were formed through illegality, 
mistake, or unjust acts. 
From the child's perspective, the right to preserve her 
identity may well be vindicated by knowing the truth about her 
past and by access to her biological family, but it may also be 
violated by coercive intervention inconsistent with respect for 
her own experiences of family attachment. More to the point, 
maintain the status quo of custody with a "psychological parent." JosEPH 
GoLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTEREffi'S OF THE CHILD 53 (1979); 
PENELOPE LEACH, CHILDREN FIRffi' 203-04, 218 (1994). 
60 See, e.g., ELINOR ROSENBERG, THE ADOPTION LIFE CYCLE 89-93 (1992) (de-
scribing adoptees' struggle to integrate biological and social facets of identity); 
Margaret R. Brown, Whose Eyes Are These, Whose Nose?, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 7, 1994, 
at 12 ('"Who am I?' is a hard question to answer when I don't even know where I 
came from."). 
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coercion may undervalue and even compromise the child's own 
capacity to examine and redefine her identity as she matures. 
As Kimberly's journey reminds us, in the end, each child must 
discover who she is and to whom she belongs. Perhaps our job, 
as law-makers and parents, is simply to make the child's jour-
ney to adulthood as safe and secure as possible. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
These cases, ranging from the nontraditional family to the 
failed adoption to the bizarre baby-switching, illustrate a basic 
tension between social and biological identities that is a press-
ing issue for modem custody law. Modern families present 
many such dilemmas because they are increasingly defined by 
functional status rather than by formal contract or genealogical 
kinship.61 If biology and marriage can no longer provide firm 
criteria for defining family, where do we tum for a more func-
tional measure? A reformed discourse of children's rights, based 
on children's needs and perspectives, could be instrumental in 
redefining families to promote values of nurture, commitment, 
and interdependence. Children's voices provide a means of 
harmonizing the intrinsic dissonance of children's rights, ac-
knowledging children's dependency and needs for connection as 
well as their individuality and emerging autonomy. Initially, 
children draw their claims for family relationship not from any 
cherished individual freedom to make and unmake the family, 
but from a natural status of dependency-the need for reliable, 
functional parenting. Young children know their families only 
through concrete experience. As children mature, their needs 
may change. Law should empower them to act as subjects in 
shaping their identities according to their emerging capacity, 
rather than treating them as objects. 
Applying notions of children's needs-based rights allows 
children's voices to be heard where the primary figures in a 
61 See Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: 
The Need for Legal Alternatives when the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has 
Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879, 962 (1984); Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have 
Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian· 
Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459, 574-75 (1990); Barba-
ra B. Woodhouse, Children's Rights: The Destruction and Promise of Family, 1993 
B.Y.U. L. REV. 497, 498. Barbara B. Woodhouse, Towards a Revitalization of Fami-
ly Law, 69 TEX. L. REV. 245, 282 (1990) (reviewing MARY ANN GLENDON, THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW: STATE, LAW AND FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES 
AND WESTERN EUROPE (1989)). 
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child's life fall outside the circle of the "traditional" nuclear 
family-cases involving grandparents, stepparents, gay and 
lesbian parents, adoptive families, and de facto care givers. 
Even in everyday cases of custody and visitation, incorporating 
children's voices and perspectives can inform family restructur-
ing and anchor the indeterminacy of children's needs in 
children's own concrete experiences of family and developing 
capacity for self-knowledge. 
